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WHAT A DUMP! THE CURRENT STATE OF ANTIDUMPING
DUTY CALCULATIONS IN NON-MARKET ECONOMY CASES
How does the administrating authority choose among possible third
countries from which to obtain these prices? . . . The answer many
respondents give is hard-bitten, perhaps cynical. They suggest in
N[on-market economies] A[ntidumping] cases, an administering
authority essentially is free to “make up the numbers.”1
—Raj Bhala

INTRODUCTION
Currently, a debate rages at the World Trade Organization (WTO) between
China on the one hand and the United States and the European Union on the
other.2 It revolves around the latter two entities’ refusal to treat China as a
market economy for the purposes of assessing an antidumping duty.3 An
antidumping duty is a tariff applied to dumped products (i.e., products that
have been sold in the importing country at less than their fair market value).4
Normally when assessing such duties, a country simply charges the violating
entity the difference between the product’s fair market value5 and the price at
which it was first sold in the importing country.6 China is preoccupied with its
status as a non-market economy (“NME”) because WTO members are allowed
to calculate the antidumping duties owed on imports from NMEs using a
different methodology that many consider to be, at best, “convoluted.”7 While
1
RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 1044
(LexisNexis 3d ed. 2008).
2
Request for Consultations by China, United States – Measures Related to Price Comparison
Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds515_e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
3
See, e.g., U.S. Set to Review China’s Market-Economy Status Bid, WSJ Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-30/u-s-set-to-review-china-s-marketeconomy-status-bid-wsj-says; Douglas Bulloch, China Doesn’t Deserve its ‘Market Economy’ Status by WTO,
FORBES (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2016/12/12/china-doesnt-deserve-itsmarket-economy-status-by-wto/#37f635112d70.
4
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, ¶ 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
5
19 U.S.C. § 1677(34)–(35) (2012). Instead of using the term “fair market value,” the statute refers to
the price at which the product is first sold for consumption in the exporting country. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(a)
(2012).
6
19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(34)–(35), 1677(a)(1)(B)(i). See also Technical Information on Antidumping,
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
7
David Dodwell, Market Economy Debate Really About Anti-dumping Shenanigans, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1899039/market-economy-debatereally-about-antidumping-shenanigans; K. William Watson, It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy
Treatment, FREE TRADE BULL. NO. 65, 1 (Mar. 9, 2016).
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arguments rage about what certain language in China’s 2000 Accession
Agreement to the World Trade Organization means or whether China is
actually a market economy, the reality, especially for purposes of the United
States, is that China’s status as a NME is unlikely to change in the near future,
and improvements to the convoluted methodology should at least be
considered.8
The history of custom duties extends back at least to the ancient
Egyptians,9 but only relatively recently have countries imposed tariffs for the
stated purpose of correcting unfair market distortions that undermine the
general social welfare promoted by free trade.10 The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947 for the express objective of
substantially reducing tariffs and other trade barriers and eliminating
preferences on a “reciprocal and mutually advantageous” basis;11 even so, it
has always allowed for the levying of antidumping and countervailing duties.12
Within eight years of the GATT’s creation, countries quickly realized the
“special difficulties [that] may exist” in trying to assess such duties on imports
from NME countries.13 Calculating the duty for dumped products is a difficult
process even in the market economy context; doing so for products from
NMEs adds another layer of complexity that substantially adds unpredictability
to the process. The significance of these administrative problems explains why
China is so concerned about its NME status.
For NME antidumping duty determinations, the U.S. Department of
Commerce (Commerce Department) is required to attempt to find a
comparable price for the dumped product by examining data from a third
country with a market economy.14 The lack of consistency or predictability in

8
Shawn Donnan, U.S. Seeks to Deny China Market Economy Status in WTO, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov.
30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f7941646-d571-11e7-8c9a-d9c0a5c8d5c9; Matthew Bey, Invading
China, One Trade Dispute at a Time, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2017/
01/17/invading-china-one-trade-dispute-at-a-time.
9
HIRONORI ASAKURA, WORLD HISTORY OF THE CUSTOMS AND TARIFFS 67 (World Customs Org.
2003).
10
John J. Barceló III, A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy Law – Confusion of Purposes,
CORNELL L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS 311, 311 (1991).
11
GATT, supra note 4, at pmbl.
12
Id. art. VI, ¶ 2. Article VI deals exclusively with antidumping and countervailing duties. It defines
countervailing duties as “special dut[ies] levied for the purpose of offsetting any . . . subsidy bestowed, directly
or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or exportation of any merchandise.” Id.
13
Id. Annex I, Addendum to Article VI, ¶ 1.2 (effectively defining non-market economy to mean “a
country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices
are fixed by the State”).
14
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (2012).
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the Commerce Department’s attempts to establish such a surrogate country and
determine a good’s fair market price has left many with the impression that the
Commerce Department “makes it up as it goes.”15 It is well established that in
large part “economic success . . . depend[s] on an efficient and predictable rule
of law.”16 The lack of predictability in the Commerce Department’s work hurts
both foreign and domestic producers.17 Foreign companies cannot know ahead
of time how much they must pay, and domestic companies cannot know how
saturated the market will be—a problem that makes it significantly more
difficult for them to predict the sales prices for their goods.18
This Comment first examines the Commerce Department’s process for
assessing duties on dumped imports from NMEs to determine this method’s
consistency. Finding problems with the Commerce Department’s results, this
Comment argues that to reduce lawsuits and add a modicum of predictability
to its determinations, the Commerce Department should adopt a more
formulaic approach for selecting the best surrogate country. More specifically,
Part I of this Comment provides not only the historical background of such
duties, but also presents the economic theory underlying such duties. Part II
lays out the basic state of antidumping duties in the United States in 2017,
while Part III raises questions about the accuracy of the process for dealing
with antidumping duties on imports from NMEs. Part IV examines how the
Canadian antidumping duty regime deals with the surrogate country selection
conundrum. Lastly, Part V presents a potential path forward for the Commerce
Department to increase the predictability of their proceedings without unduly
hampering their discretion.
I.

THE HISTORY OF AND THEORY BEHIND ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

Custom duties trace their origins back to the gifts and bribes ancient
merchants would give a king or chieftain for the right to trade within that
15
K. William Watson, Will Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly Into the Night?, 763 POL’Y
ANALYSIS 1, 1, 4 (Oct. 28, 2014); see also Patricia Piskorski, A Dangerous Discretionary “Duty”, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 598 (2005) (“The U.S. antidumping rubric is left open to criticism . . . because of its
unpredictability and lack of accuracy.”).
16
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Apr. 4, 2003), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2003/20030404/default.htm; see also THE AMERICAS SOC’Y & THE COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, RULE OF LAW,
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 18 (2007) (“An environment in which the administration of justice . . .
is more predictable . . . eases the constraints for expansion of . . . enterprises.”).
17
Watson, Will Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly Into the Night?, supra note 15, at 3–4.
18
Id.
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sovereign’s territory.19 The adoption of mercantilism by the European powers
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought about a new rationale for
the implementation of tariffs; sovereigns hoped tariffs would reduce imports
and encourage exports, thereby encouraging the flow into the king’s coffers of
money deriving from local production.20 Very early in its history, the United
States recognized the detrimental impact another country’s export subsidies
and dumping could have on a national economy.21 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
United States was the first country to enact what would now be considered a
countervailing duty law when it passed the McKinley Tariff of 1890.22 The
McKinley Tariff imposed an additional duty on sugar from countries paying
“directly or indirectly, a bounty on the exportation” of certain kinds of sugar.23
The first antidumping duty law came in 1904 when Canada created a “special
duty of customs equal to the difference between [a product’s] fair market value
and [its] selling price.”24 Even before that law passed, critics expressed
concern over potential administrative problems.25 Nevertheless, countervailing
and antidumping duties became fairly common within the tariff laws of the
first half of the twentieth century and so were incorporated into the GATT in
1947.26
In theory, antidumping and countervailing duty laws exist to “prevent
companies from establishing monopolies through the use of predatory
pricing.”27 Even temporary or sporadic dumping can theoretically force local
19
ASAKURA, supra note 9, at 19, 46 (“[I]n ancient and medieval times Customs duty was primarily a
means of raising revenue for the state or a royal family.”).
20
Id. at 189–94.
21
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES, 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 989 (Dec. 1, 1791). In
early 1790, Congress asked Alexander Hamilton to report on the subject of manufacturing and promotion of
such. In his report, he noted that:

the greatest obstacle of all to the successful prosecution of a new branch of industry in a country
in which it was before unknown, consists . . . [of] the bounties premiums and other aids which are
granted . . . by the nations, in which the establishments to be imitated are previously introduced.
It is well known . . . that certain nations grant bounties on the exportation of particular
commodities, to enable their own workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors, in the
countries to which those commodities are sent.
Id.
22

Barceló, supra note 10, at 321–23.
McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, ¶ 237 (1890).
24
An Act to Amend the Customs Tariff, 1897, S.C. 1904 c. 11, § 19 (Can.).
25
LXVI OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF THE DOMINION OF
CANADA, 9th Parliament, 4th Sess. 5742 (1904) (Thomas Birkett states, “I would like to point out how difficult
it is going to be to carry out the antidumping clause.”).
26
See Barceló, supra note 10, at 314–15, 322–23.
27
Jean-Marc Leclerc, Reforming Antidumping Law: Balancing the Interests of Consumers and
Domestic Industries, 44 MCGILL L.J. 111, 113 (1999).
23
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producers to exit a market, which means the economy will have to bear the
cost of retraining people or rebuilding facilities when the dumping inevitably
ends.28 Dumping can also force people to change jobs, which can have an
effect on the morale and efficiency of the community.29 Economic analyses
have, at best, left unresolved whether the harm caused by dumping or export
subsidies does in fact outweigh the benefit of cheaper goods; nevertheless,
such law retains a central place in many countries’ trade policies.30 It is on this
controversial theoretical basis that support for antidumping duties must rely
before even bringing in practical administrative concerns.
II. ANTIDUMPING DUTIES IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY
For antidumping and countervailing duty purposes, U.S. law defines NMEs
as those that, according to the Commerce Department, do “not operate on
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in
such countr[ies] do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”31 Eleven
countries are currently designated by the Commerce Department as NMEs,32
but by far the most significant two are China and Vietnam.33 Every year, goods
28

Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
30
Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L. L. & ECON. 1, 2, 11 (1995)
(“Empirical evidence strongly suggests that this gain [to society in the form of lower prices] outweighs the cost
to producers in the import country, measured by reduced profits, and to their employees, in terms of reduced
employment.”).
31
19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2012).
32
De Facto Criteria for Establishing a Separate Rate in Antidumping Proceedings Involving NonMarket Economy Countries, 78 Fed. Reg. 40430, 40430 n.3 (July 5, 2013). The other nine NMEs are Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Once a
country is determined to be a nonmarket economy, that determination remains in effect until revoked by the
Commerce Department. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(C)(i) (“Any determination that a foreign country is a
nonmarket economy shall remain in effect until revoked by the administering authority.”). The Commerce
Department recently indicated that of these, at least Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and
Turkmenistan are still considered nonmarket economies. See Int’l Trade Admin., Decision Memorandum for
the Preliminary Affirmative Determination: Countervailing Duty Investigation of Truck and Bus Tires from
the People’s Republic of China; and the Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances in
Part, at 21 (June 27, 2016), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/prc/2016-15837-1.pdf. Certain imports from
Belarus and Moldova are still the subject of antidumping duty orders. See Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel
Wire Rod from Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Moldova, and Trinidad and Tobago: Continuation of Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Orders, 79 Fed. Reg. 38008 (July 3, 2014); Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from
Belarus, Indonesia, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, the People’s Republic of China, and Ukraine: Continuation of
Antidumping Duty Orders, 78 Fed. Reg. 43858 (July 22, 2013).
33
Although the list does not include Cuba, it would likely be added should the embargo be removed.
When determining if a country is a non-market economy, the Commerce Department must consider, among
other things, “(i) the extent to which the country’s currency is convertible into the currency of other countries,
(ii) the extent to which wages are determined by free bargaining between labor and management . . . , (iv) the
extent of government ownership or control of the means of production, [and] (v) the extent of government
29
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from those two countries constitute approximately twenty-three percent of all
imports into the United States.34 Of the 321 antidumping duty orders in place
as of September 13, 2017, 120 involved products from China or Vietnam.35
Almost one third of all import duties collected during 2014, 2015, and 2016
were on imports from those two countries.36
As noted above, one major complaint with the Commerce Department’s
process for assessing antidumping duties on imports from NMEs is that neither
foreign exporters nor the domestic industry can predict how large a tariff will
be charged on products.37 “The U.S. antidumping rubric is left open to
criticism . . . because of its unpredictability and lack of accuracy.”38 In
particular, critics argue that “the use of nonmarket economy methodology
harms domestic import-using businesses and consumers” because it “results in
unpredictable and unrealistically high antidumping duties.”39 The inability to
plan for the future creates significant difficulties for foreign producers and
exporters, while American consumers have to pay higher prices.

control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises . . . .” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(18)(B); see Day Zero or D-Day, THE ECONOMIST (May 16, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/
americas/21651292-tricky-task-unifying-crazy-system-exchange-rates-day-zero-or-d-day; Double Trouble,
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/10/cubas-currency;
CLAY BOGGS & GEOFF THALE, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, LABOR RIGHTS AND CUBA’S
ECONOMIC REFORMS 2, 5 (Dec. 2013), https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Labor_Rights_and_Cubas_
Economic_Reforms.pdf; Karen DeYoung, In Cuba, Prosperity Will Require Changes to Government Control,
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-cuba-prosperitywill-require-changes-to-government-control/2015/02/14/71844fee-afe0-11e4-886b-c22184f27c35_story.html;
Dudley Althaus, Cuba Moves to Legalize Small- and Medium-Size Businesses, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-moves-to-legalize-small-and-medium-size-businesses-1464132702; Sarah
Marsh & Marc Frank, Cuba Says Economy Shrank This Year In Tandem with Venezuela Crisis, REUTERS
(Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-economy/cuba-says-economy-shrank-this-year-intandem-with-venezuela-crisis-idUSKBN14G1E0.
34
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services: FT-900 Supplement, Exhibit 4
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/trade/2017/pdf/trad1216.pdf (noting that for
2016, the value of goods imported into the United States from China was equal to $462,813,000,000 and the
value of imports from Vietnam was $42,109,200,000, while the total value of all imported goods was
$2,188,940,600,000).
35
See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in Place, https://www.
usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/orders.xls (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
36
See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, https://dataweb.usitc.gov/
scripts/user_set.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (noting that import duties on goods from China totaled $19.637
billion in 2014, $20.84 billion in 2015, and $18.957 billion in 2016, and import duties on goods from Vietnam
were $1.423 billion in 2014, $1.673 billion in 2015, and $1.662 billion in 2016, while overall the government
collected $64.974 billion in import duties in 2014, $67.07 billion in 2015, and $62.349 billion in 2016).
37
Piskorski, supra note 15, at 598.
38
Id.
39
Watson, It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy Treatment, supra note 7, at 1.
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To properly understand the uncertainty companies face when dealing with
exports from non-market economies, it is first necessary to understand the
problems inherent to all antidumping duty calculations. Current U.S.
antidumping (and countervailing duty) law comes from the Tariff Act of 1930,
which Congress has substantively amended on numerous occasions.40
Antidumping duty investigations may be initiated upon the request of a
domestic industry,41 at which point the International Trade Commission must
make an initial determination as to whether a domestic industry is being (or is
threatened to be) injured.42 If that is the case, the Commerce Department
preliminarily determines whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that
merchandise is being sold at less than fair value.43 Broadly speaking, the
Commerce Department makes this preliminary determination by calculating
what the dumping margin for each exporter should be.44 The dumping margin
is equal to the home market price of the product in question (the normal value)
minus the price of the product when it was first sold in the United States (the
export price).45 If the dumping margin is greater than zero, then the product
was “dumped,”46 and the foreign exporter must pay an antidumping duty equal
to the dumping margin.47 After making preliminary calculations, the
Commerce Department takes comments from foreign exporters and the
domestic industry and then recalculates everything to come up with a final
determination for the dumping margin.48
Although this is relatively simple in theory, in practice the process quickly
becomes complicated. For instance, all foreign exporters of a particular
product do not sell that product for the same price in the United States.49
40
19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683g (2012). The provisions dealing with antidumping and countervailing duties
were last amended by the Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–25, title IV,
§§ 401–33, 130 Stat. 155–71 (Feb. 24, 2016).
41
19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673a (2012) (for the language relevant to countervailing duties, see the
equivalent language in §§ 1671–1671h); Bryan Johnson, A Guide to Antidumping Laws: America’s Unfair
Trade Practice, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 21, 1992), http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/guideantidumping-laws-americas-unfair-trade-practice. Cf. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1671h (containing equivalent
language relevant to countervailing duties).
42
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a).
43
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b).
44
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d).
45
19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(34)–(35). In other words, dumping margin equals normal value minus export
price. See id.
46
In reality, if the dumping margin is calculated to be less than two percent ad valorem, then the
dumping margin is considered de minimis and no duty is imposed. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(3).
47
19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673e(b)(1).
48
19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(a), (c).
49
See, e.g., Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 2009-2010
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 76375, 76381 (Dec. 7, 2011).
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However, given that often up to sixty companies are subject to an
investigation, calculating a dumping margin for every single exporter would be
extremely time consuming for the Commerce Department.50 Consequently, the
Tariff Act of 1930 allows the Commerce Department to select a few exporters,
called mandatory respondents, and calculate each of their dumping margins.51
The weighted average of those values is then used as the all-others rate (i.e.,
the dumping margin rate for all the exporters who weren’t examined
individually).52 Although other exporters can request to be individually
examined as voluntary respondents, the Commerce Department has wide
discretion in taking on that additional burden.53 The Commerce Department
has never promulgated regulations explaining how it chooses which companies
will be mandatory respondents and so it is only bound by the broad language
of the statute.54 Presumably for cost-saving reasons, the Commerce
Department tends to choose only the two largest exporters and deny most
applications to be a voluntary respondent.55 Problematically, though, numerous
circumstances often force the Commerce Department to ultimately dismiss one
or both of mandatory respondents’ numbers, meaning that vast swaths of
exporters are given an all-others rate based entirely off of a single company’s

50
E.g., Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1267 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013)
(noting that there were 159 companies under review). The Commerce Department once tried to argue that
calculating an individual dumping margin for each of the only four exporters of the good was administratively
burdensome enough to justify relying on the averaging method. Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal ByProducts Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 1125, 1128 (2009).
51
§ 1677f–1(c)(2). Should a mandatory respondent’s dumping margin end up as de minimis, then that
margin cannot be used for averaging purposes when calculating the all-others rate.
52
Id.
53
See, e.g., Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1319 n.16 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2016) (“Commerce’s recent history evidences a questionable tendency not to accept any voluntary
respondents.”); Longkou Haimeng Mach. Co. v. United States, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade 1142, 1151 (2008). Until
recently, margins for voluntary respondents were not even included in the calculation of the all-others rate.
MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 753 F.3d 1237, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(d)(3)
invalid).
54
§ 1677f–1(c)(2).

If it is not practicable to make individual weighted average dumping margin determinations under
paragraph (1) because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation or
review, the administering authority may determine the weighted average dumping margins for a
reasonable number of exporters or producers by limiting its examination to—
(A) a sample of exporters, producers, or types of products that is statistically valid based on the
information available to the administering authority at the time of selection, or
(B) exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the
exporting country that can be reasonably examined.
55
See, e.g., Shenzhen Xinboda, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 n.22; Husteel Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 180 F.
Supp. 3d 1330, 1334–35 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016).
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numbers or even the previous year’s numbers.56 This leads to fairly large
changes in a company’s dumping margin, not only from year to year, but also
from initial determinations to final determinations to remand results.57
III. NON-MARKET ECONOMY COMPLICATIONS
On top of the framework described in Part II comes the additional
“convoluted” methodology for dealing with exports from NMEs.58 The
underlying premise for treating NMEs differently is that in such countries,
“domestic sale prices are not market-determined but are instead set by central
planners . . . [and so the prices] may bear no meaningful relationship . . . .” to
the good’s actual value.59 With the home market’s prices unsuitable for
providing a normal value, calculating the dumping margin for products from
NMEs is exceedingly difficult; it requires the Commerce Department to
somehow arrive at a surrogate value for the normal value.60 To create a
surrogate value, the Commerce Department builds the price from the ground
up.61 It takes the cost of the elements used in producing the merchandise and
adds to that value various other amounts representing general expenses, profits,
or the cost of containers and packaging.62 Of course, the Commerce
Department cannot get those numbers directly from the non-market economy,
so it must determine those quantities by looking to values from the surrogate
country. The surrogate country itself must be “at a level of economic
development comparable to that of the NME country, and significant producers
of comparable merchandise.”63 Beyond that, the Commerce Department has no
other statutory instructions telling it how to create this surrogate normal value;

56
An “all others rate” is the dumping rate assigned to exporters and producers not individually
investigated. § 1673b(d)(1)(A)(ii). It is supposed to equal the weighted average of the individually investigated
companies. § 1673d(c)(5). For examples of how the Commerce Department often excludes all the exporters
individually investigated so that they have trouble calculating an “all others rate,” see Shenzhen Xinboda, 180
F. Supp. 3d at 1322–24; Navneet Publ’ns (India) Ltd. v. United States, No. 13-00204, 2015 WL 1963768, at
*3 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 4, 2015) (explaining how both individually investigated respondents had zero-percent
rates).
57
See, e.g., Navneet Publ’ns, No. 13-00204, 2015 WL 1963768, at *1, *4 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 4, 2015)
(demonstrating how the “all others rate” dropped from 11.01% to 0.5%); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 179
F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1119–20 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016) (“all others rate” changing from 55.29% to 5.79%).
58
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c); IMP. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, POLICY BULLETIN 04.1 (Mar. 1,
2004), http://enforcement.trade.gov/policy/bull04-1.html; Watson, It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy
Treatment, supra note 7, at 1.
59
Watson, Will Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly Into the Night?, supra note 15, at 7–8.
60
19 U.S. C.§ 1677b(c)(1)(B).
61
19 U.S.C. §§ 1677b(c)(1)(B), (c)(4).
62
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.408.
63
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4).
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the only other requirement is that the Commerce Department must base the
valuation “on the best available information.”64
The Commerce Department has promulgated regulations on the matter,
which provide some additional guidelines.65 The regulations help clarify that
economic comparability should be measured by GDP per capita, that the
Commerce Department will normally favor using a single country to derive all
the surrogate numbers it needs, and that the Commerce Department will favor
using publicly available information to value the factors of production.66
Representing the entirety of the Commerce Department’s direction, the
statutory and regulatory framework still leaves the Commerce Department with
a significant amount of discretion.
To understand exactly how little guidance those provisions provide the
practitioners at the Commerce Department who make those determinations, a
simple hypothetical is helpful. Imagine it is 2014 and the International Trade
Commission has preliminarily determined that the domestic honey industry is
being threatened by the dumping of honey from Vietnam.67 The Commerce
Department needs to establish a surrogate country that it can use to determine
the cost of the factors of production (like hives, flowers, beekeeping suits,
glass storage jars, etc.), the cost of labor, and the average profits of honeymaking companies. The Commerce Department thinks it will be able to find
that information from the following countries:

64
§ 1677b(c)(1)(B); see Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United
States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In determining the valuation of the factors of production, the
critical question is whether the methodology used by Commerce is based on the best available information and
establishes antidumping margins as accurately as possible.”).
65
19 C.F.R. § 351.408.
66
Id.
67
Although it is honey from China, not honey from Vietnam, that is actually subject to an antidumping
duty order, it is one of the few products subject to such an order that is simple to understand. See Notice of
Antidumping Duty Order and Amendment to Final Determination: Honey from the People’s Republic of
China, 66 Fed. Reg. 59026, 59026 (Dec. 10, 2001).
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TABLE 168
Country

Honey Production
(tonnes)

Gross National Income (GNI)
per Capita
(USD)

India

61,945

1,560

Tanzania

30,905

920

Romania

18,040

9,600

Vietnam

14,218

1,900

Australia

13,198

64,860

Poland

12,836

13,360

Uzbekistan

8,751

2,110

Egypt

5,443

3,250

Pakistan

4,371

1,390

Morocco

3,800

3,040

Nicaragua

560

1,890

How does the Commerce Department determine which country’s data to use?
The surrogate country must be both economically comparable to Vietnam and
a significant producer of honey, but what does that mean? Should it value
economies of scale and start with the country most similar in production
capacity to Vietnam and see if it is economically comparable? Or should the
Commerce Department start by seeing if any of the most economically
comparable countries produce significant amounts of honey? Imagine if it
favors economic comparability. Should Nicaragua’s 560 tons of honey count
as significant production? Does it matter that Nicaragua also produced 11,000
tons of a red dye made from a process extremely similar to that used to
produce honey? What if Moroccan honey is not edible but rather almost solid
and used only for medical purposes? What if the information on the cost of
beekeeper suits and glass bottles in Pakistan comes from a website entitled
“Aliens ARE AMOng uS!?!?!!” or, more realistically, cannot be easily
authenticated because it comes from a website that is only in Urdu or Pashto?

68
These are a selection of countries that at first glance might seem to have similar numbers to Vietnam.
Honey production information comes from FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). For the GNI per capita information, see
GNI per Capita Ranking Atlas Method (Current US$), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2015&name_desc=false&start=2014 (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
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What if Turkmenistan is dumping glass bottles into India and thereby
artificially reducing the price there for that factor of production?
The Commerce Department has set out its policy for approaching such
questions.69 According to Policy Bulletin 04.1, the process begins with the
creation of a list of market economy countries economically comparable to the
NME.70 The Commerce Department then determines which of those countries
are producers of comparable merchandise.71 It notes that, while “identical
merchandise . . . qualifies as . . . comparable merchandise,” what other
merchandise counts as comparable “is best determined on a case-by-case
basis.”72
Next, the Commerce Department judges which of the countries are in fact
significant producers of that comparable merchandise.73 What counts as
significant production is to be judged according to the “characteristics of [the]
world production of, and trade in, comparable merchandise.”74 Often,
“significant producer” means “significant net exporter,” but “the standard for
‘significant producer’ will vary from case to case,”75 and therefore, “[b]ecause
the meaning of ‘significant producer’ can differ significantly from case to case,
fixed standards . . . have not been adopted.”76
Finally, if necessary, the Commerce Department selects from the
remaining countries the one whose data are best according to five
considerations.77 Notably, in this process, the Commerce Department does not
give extra weight to a country that is more economically comparable or more
significant of a producer.78 The Commerce Department concludes the Policy
Bulletin by pointing out that there will be exceptions when this particular
sequential process is not appropriate and when it would be better “to address
economic comparability only after the significant producer of comparable
merchandise requirement is met.”79 In laying out this policy, the Commerce
69

POLICY BULLETIN 04.1, supra note 58.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. (The five considerations are: (1) does the data represent period wide price averages; (2) are the
prices provided specific to the input in question; (3) are the prices the net of taxes and import duties; (4) are the
prices contemporaneous with the period of review; and (5) are the data publicly available?).
78
Id.
79
Id.
70
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Department chose to preserve its discretion rather than to bring more
consistency and predictability to its work.
Companies have an extremely difficult time trying to predict the duties
they will owe,80 a problem exemplified by the importation of fresh garlic from
China.81 Fresh garlic from China has been subject to an antidumping duty
order since 1994 and offers a good insight into how duties can fluctuate over
time for any number of reasons.82 Over the last decade, the calculated separate
rate dumping margin83 has swung significantly not only from year to year, but
also from each year’s preliminary determination to the year’s ultimate
determination. This strongly indicates that adding up the costs of the inputs
needed to produce the product in a third country is simply not a reliable way to
estimate what the production costs were in the NME.
TABLE 2
Period of
Admin.
Review
Review
13th
Nov. 06–Oct. 07
13th
Nov. 06–Oct. 07
14th
Nov. 07–Oct. 08

Determination
Type
Preliminary84
Final85
Preliminary86

Surrogate
Country
India
India
N/A

Separate
Rate
$0.10
$1.03
$1.03

80
Alan Luberda, Supply Chain Basics: Thirteen Things Every Importer Should Know About Risks
Involved with Sourcing Products Subject to AD/CVD Orders, THOMPSON REUTERS: TAX & ACCT., Feb. 2014,
at 15.
81
See Antidumping Duty Order; Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China, 59 Fed. Reg.
59209, 59210 (Nov. 16, 1994).
82
See id.
83
The separate rate dumping margin is simply the “all others rate” discussed above, supra note 56, but
in the NME context. Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2009).
84
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty
Administrative and New Shipper Reviews and Intent to Rescind, In Part, the Antidumping Duty
Administrative and New Shipper Reviews, 73 Fed. Reg. 74462, 74468 (Dec. 8, 2008). The dumping margin
was given as a percentage (7.07%), but given how the percentage 72.74% equated to $1.03 in the final review,
the preliminary dumping margin rate of 7.07% would be equal to $0.10.
85
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Partial Rescission of the 13th
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper Reviews, 74 Fed. Reg. 29174, 29176 (June 19,
2009). The dumping margin was given as a percentage (72.74%), but the fourteenth administrative review
used the same dumping margin. Infra note 87.
86
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of, and Intent to Rescind, in
Part, the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 64677, 64684 (Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter
Preliminary Results AR 14].
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14th
15th
15th
15th
16th
16th
17th
17th
18th
18th
18th

Nov. 07–Oct. 08
Nov. 08–Oct. 09
Nov. 08–Oct. 09
Nov. 08–Oct. 09
Nov. 09–Oct. 10
Nov. 09–Oct. 10
Nov. 10–Oct. 11
Nov. 10–Oct. 11
Nov. 11–Oct. 12
Nov. 11–Oct. 12
Nov. 11–Oct. 12

18th

Nov. 11–Oct. 12

Final87
Preliminary88
Final89
1st Remand Results90
Preliminary91
Final92
Preliminary93
Final94
Preliminary95
Final96
1st Remand Results97
2nd Remand
Results98

[Vol. 32

N/A
India
India
India
India
India
Ukraine
N/A
Philippines
Philippines
Philippines

$1.03
$0.72
$0.06
$0.02
$0.48
$0.41
$1.81
$1.28
$1.47
$1.82
$1.82

Ukraine

$2.19

87
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Finals Results and Partial Rescission of the 14th
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 34976, 34976 (June 21, 2010).
88
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of, Partial Rescission of, and
Intent to Rescind in Part, the 15th Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 80458, 80467
(Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Preliminary Results AR 15].
89
Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand, Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. v. United
States, No. 11-00267, at 1 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Final Remand Results AR 15] (noting
that the Commerce Department revised Xinboda’s rate downward from $0.06 per kilogram to $0.02 per
kilogram).
90
Id. The separate rate entities did not object to the Final Results, but if they had, their rate would have
gone down as well because for AR 15, the separate rate was just equal to Xinboda’s rate. See Preliminary
Results AR 15, supra note 88, at 80465.
91
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 2009-2010
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 76375, 76382 (Dec. 7, 2011).
92
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of the 2009-2010 Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 34346, 34348 (June 11, 2012).
93
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 2010-2011
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 73980, 73981 (Dec. 12, 2012).
94
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of the 2010-2011 Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 78 Fed. Reg. 36168, 36169 (June 17, 2013) [hereinafter Final Results AR 17].
95
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of the
18th Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2011-2012, 78 Fed. Reg. 77653, 77654 (Dec. 24, 2013).
96
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Finals Results and Partial Rescission of the 18th
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2011-2012, 79 Fed. Reg. 36721, 36723 (June 30, 2014).
97
Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand: Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of
China, at 2, 24, Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v. United States, No. 14-00180 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 9, 2016).
98
THOMAS GILGUNN, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DRAFT RESULTS OF REDETERMINATION PURSUANT TO
REMAND: FRESH GARLIC FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 18 (2016).
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Nov. 12–Oct. 13
Nov. 12–Oct. 13
Nov. 13–Oct. 14
Nov. 13–Oct. 14

Preliminary99
Final100
Preliminary101
Final102

Average Separate Rate Margin Actually Applied103

N/A
N/A
Romania
Romania

447

$1.82
$1.82
$2.72
$2.75
$1.36

Among the administrative reviews covering imports from November 2006
through October 2014, the Commerce Department twice determined from the
outset that it lacked enough information to calculate a new separate entity
dumping margin.104 Thus, for the 14th and 19th reviews, the margins in the
preliminary determinations equaled those of the final determinations because
the Commerce Department assigned separate companies the rate from the
previous year.105 However, even including those two reviews, the average per
kilogram change from one year to the next was $0.56.106 The average
difference between each review’s preliminary and ultimate dumping margins
was $0.42 per kilogram, while the average ultimate separate rate dumping
margins for those years was only $1.36.107 To place those numbers into

99
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 19th Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review; 2012-2013, 79 Fed. Reg. 72625, 72627 (Dec. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Preliminary
Results AR 19].
100
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Partial Rescission of the 19th
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2012-2013, 80 Fed. Reg. 34141, 34142 (June 15, 2015). Because
the Commerce Department did not want to calculate a separate rate, it is based on the previous review and will
almost certainly change to match the ending rate of the 18th review.
101
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results, Preliminary Intent to Rescind
and Partial Rescission of the 20th Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2013-2014, 80 Fed. Reg. 75972,
75974 (Dec. 7, 2015).
102
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Final Rescission of the 20th
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2013-2014, 80 Fed. Reg. 39897, 39898 (June 20, 2016).
103
This is the unweighted average. Creating a weighted average is not possible because the amount each
shipper imports is kept confidential and not every shipper receives a separate rate. YURI STARIKOV,
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES: SEPARATE RATE 13 (New York Law School Center for International Law, 2011).
This number also rests on three assumptions: 1) the department’s appeal of the court’s decision regarding the
eighteenth administrative review will fail; 2) the ultimate dumping margin for the nineteenth administrative
review will in fact end up being $2.19; and 3) the challenge to the twentieth administrative review’s
calculations will fail. Id.
104
Preliminary Results AR 14, supra note 86, at 34978; Preliminary Results AR 19, supra note 99, at
72626.
105
Preliminary Results AR 14, supra note 86, at 34979; Preliminary Results AR 19, supra note 99, at
72625.
106
Again, this calculation assumes the ultimate rate for the 19th administrative review will be $2.19.
107
Again, this calculation assumes the ultimate rate for the 19th administrative review will be $2.19.
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context, the average year-end price of fresh garlic in the United States over this
time was approximately $1.25 per kilogram.108
Many factors in these analyses are interdependent—for example, the price
of garlic in the United States, the costs of production of garlic in both China
and the United States, the export price of Chinese garlic, and the dumping
margin assigned to Chinese garlic imports all depend on each other. Therefore,
using them to make assumptions about each other can be difficult. That being
said, the data still suggest something is wrong. Theoretically, two formulas
should be true. The first formula is a restatement of the definition of a dumping
margin—the production cost of garlic in China minus the export price equals
the dumping margin. The second states the idea that the total value of garlic in
the United States must equal the price at which Chinese garlic is sold, times the
amount of Chinese garlic sold, plus the price at which all the other garlic in the
United States was sold, times the amount of that garlic. Thus, for the 2007–
2014 time period described by the variables in the Table 3, those two equations
can be stated as:

108
U.S. Garlic Price Received, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/indicators/us_garlic_price_received (last
visited Jan. 23, 2018) (looking at the year-end prices for 2007–14).
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CPC - PE = DM109
&
(AC * PE) + (AA * PU) = PA * (AC + AA)
TABLE 3
Variable
Cost of Producing Garlic in China

Symbol
CPC

Export Price

PE

Dumping Margin
Amount of Chinese Garlic Imported into
the USA
Amount of Garlic in the USA not
Originating from China
Price Non-Chinese Garlic is Sold in the
USA

DM

Value

$1.3625 / kg110

AC
526,813 tonnes111
AA
1,502,208 tonnes112
PU

Cost of Producing Garlic in the USA

CPU

Average Price of Garlic

PA

$1.254 / kg113

Assuming that U.S. producers were not selling their garlic at a loss for
eight years, then, at the very least, CPU (the cost of producing garlic in the
United States) must equal PU (the price of non-Chinese garlic sold in the
United States).114 Under that assumption and plugging in the known numbers,
unless China was selling the garlic for more than an eighty-percent loss—not
even including the cost of the antidumping duties—for the entire eight year

109
Not all imported Chinese garlic had the same dumping margin (or export price). Given that the
largest exporters were thrice assessed a dumping margin of $0.00 during this time period, the true average
dumping margin for all imports might be lower. Conversely, given that garlic imports from state-run
companies come with a $4.71 duty, it’s possible that the true average is higher. The separate rate suffices as an
approximation of the average in the absence of other information. See also Leigh Kamping-Carder, ITA
Maintains 4.71% Duties on Chinese Garlic, LAW360 (June 22, 2010), https://www.law360.com/articles/
176483/ita-maintains-4-71-duties-on-chinese-garlic.
110
See supra note 107.
111
See supra note 36.
112
See id; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 68. Total Amount of Garlic in the
United States equals Amount Produced in the United States, plus Total Amount Imported, minus Total
Amount Imported from China, minus Amount Exported equals 1,463,920, plus 628,011, minus 526,813, minus
62,910 equals 1,502,208.
113
See supra note 108.
114
One would actually expect that CPU < PU.
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period (so that PE < $0.24), then the cost of producing garlic in China was
greater than the cost of producing garlic in the United States.115 This seems
highly unlikely.116 The more likely explanation is that the Commerce
Department’s unpredictable method for calculating the CPC (the cost of
producing garlic in China) and subsequently the DM (“dumping margin”),
from surrogate values, yielded unreliable results.
This unpredictability is most clearly seen in the 15th, 17th, and 18th
reviews. In the preliminary determination for the 15th administrative review,
which covered most of 2009, the Commerce Department used surrogate values
from India when calculating the factors of production.117 It therefore initially
determined the separate rate dumping margin to be $0.72 per kilogram.118
However, before issuing its final determination, the Commerce Department
was persuaded to switch from using a generic wholesale price index to a garlic
specific price index and to use more recent records when looking at an Indian
company to see what appropriate financial ratios were for similar businesses.119
These two changes, among others, caused the ultimate dumping margin for the
15th administrative review to plummet to $0.02.120
In the 17th administrative review, the Commerce Department initially used
Ukraine as the surrogate and came up with a dumping margin of $1.81 per
kilogram for the separate rate entities.121 Before issuing its final determination,
the Commerce Department was persuaded that the database it used to
determine the price of garlic bulbs in Ukraine was unreliable and switched to a
115
To determine at what point CPC = CPU, we can rewrite the dumping margin formula so that PU - PE =
DM. Plugging in the $1.36 for the DM, we can rewrite PU in terms of PE: PU = 1.36 + PE. Plugging that into the
other equation produces (AA * (1.36*PE) = PA * (AC + AA) - (AC * PE)). Filling in the other known factors
from Table 3 yields the equation 1,502,208 * (1.36 + PE = {[1.25 * (526,813 + 1,502,208)] – (526,813 * PE)}).
Changing the assumptions leads to equally questionable results. For example, let’s say that, in reality, China is
selling their garlic at a fifty-percent loss. In that case, CPC = $2.72 and PE = $1.36. Thus, PU = {[1.25 *
(526,813 + 1,502,208)] – (526,813 * 1.36)} / 1,502,208 = $1.21 = CPU. This means that the cost of production
of garlic in China ($2.72) was more than 120% greater than the cost of garlic production in the United States
($1.21).
116
JOANNA BONARRIVA, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA’S AGRIC. TRADE: COMPETITIVE
CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS ON U.S. EXPS., App’x D-3 (Mar. 2011) (noting that an American trade association
explicitly “stated that Chinese dehy[drated] garlic has a competitive advantage over U.S.-produced
dehy[drated] garlic in all markets because of lower production costs.”).
117
Preliminary Results AR 15, supra note 88, at 80462.
118
Id. at 80467.
119
Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Partial Rescission, in Part, of the
2008-2009 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37321, 37323 (June 27, 2011).
120
Final Remand Results AR 15, supra note 89, at 1.
121
DAVID LINDGREN, IMP. ADMIN., ADMIN. REVIEW OF THE ANTIDUMPING DUTY ORDER ON FRESH
GARLIC FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: SURROGATE VALUES FOR THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS 1
(Dec. 3, 2012).
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different Ukrainian database. This caused the mandatory respondents’ dumping
margins to effectively become $0.00.122 Prohibited by law from using de
minimis margins to calculate the separate rate, the Commerce Department
exercised its statutory prerogative to “use any reasonable method” and chose
the $1.28 dumping margin from a new-shipper review two years earlier—still
based on Indian data.123
In the 18th review, the Commerce Department selected the Philippines as
the surrogate country and arrived at a preliminary dumping margin of $1.47 for
separate rate entities.124 The Commerce Department chose the Philippines even
though that country produced only 9,056 metric tons of fresh garlic during the
year in question, which was less than 0.04% of the worldwide production;
consequently, an importer challenged the Commerce Department’s
determination that the Philippines was a significant producer of fresh garlic.125
The Commerce Department insisted that it could define “significant” as
“noticeably or measurably large” and that Policy Bulletin 04.1 expressly chose
not to assign a minimum number or percentage to what could be considered
significant.126 The Court of International Trade rejected the Commerce
Department’s argument, noting that Policy Bulletin 04.1 indicates that the
Commerce Department should judge whether production is significant by
looking to the “characteristics of world production.”127 The Court held the
Commerce Department’s decision to be in error because its definition
“involved no comparative analysis” whatsoever.128 After having its first
remand results—noting that the Philippines was forty-third out of ninety-five
garlic producing countries—struck down, the Commerce Department
reluctantly settled on Ukraine as the surrogate country in the second remand
results.129 This change, along with the determination that one of the mandatory
respondents had not been fully cooperative, raised the ultimate separate rate
dumping margin to $2.16.130
During this review, one respondent kept noting that Thailand produced
eight times more garlic than the Philippines and, after India, was the “second

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Final Results AR 17, supra note 94, at 36169.
Id.
Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1317 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015).
Id. at 1339.
Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1238 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016).
Id.
Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 1340.
GILGUNN, supra note 98, at 18.
Id.
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most significant producer [on the] record.”131 The respondent urged the
Commerce Department to “properly weigh the relative [in]significance of the
Philippines’s garlic production.”132 The Commerce Department responded by
essentially arguing that even when looking for a surrogate for the largest
producer of garlic, greater production does not make a country a better
surrogate. It correctly noted that the respondent “misreads section 773(c) [of]
the Act; the criterion is significant production, not the most production.
Consequently, not being the greatest producer of garlic does not preclude a
country from being a significant producer.”133 Thus, the Commerce
Department refused in this case to select Thailand over the Philippines simply
because Thailand had greater production. This decision conforms with Policy
Bulletin 04.1 when it states that “the Statute does not require that the
Department use a surrogate country that is the most significant producer” and
“the extent to which a country is a significant producer should not be judged
against . . . the comparative production of the” other economically comparable
countries.134
Considering the Commerce Department’s reluctance in that administrative
review of fresh garlic to look at significant production in terms of larger or
smaller producers, the Commerce Department’s rationale for choosing
Thailand as the surrogate country in Calgon Carbon Corp. seems confusing at
first.135 Calgon dealt with an appeal of a dumping margin calculation for the
antidumping duty on certain activated carbon products from China.136 For its
preliminary determination, the Commerce Department chose the Philippines as
the primary surrogate country and found the separate rate dumping margin to
be $3.13 per kilogram.137 A party challenged that the merchandise being used
to calculate the primary factor of production was not actually comparable.138
For its final determination, the Commerce Department accepted that party’s
131
Brief for Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. at 29, Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China, Case
No. A-570-831 - Annual Review, Review Period: November 1, 2011 through October 31, 2012 (May 14,
2014).
132
Id. at 36.
133
U.S. DEPT. OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., A-570-831, ISSUES AND DECISION MEMORANDUM FOR
THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE ANTIDUMPING DUTY ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW: FRESH GARLIC FROM THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 2011-2012 ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 8 (2013).
134
POLICY BULLETIN 04.1, supra note 58.
135
Calgon Carbon Corp. v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1240–42 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016).
136
Id. at 1224.
137
Id. at 1227.
138
By far the biggest factor of production is anthracite coal. Id. (citing Final Results of Redetermination
Pursuant to Ct. Order, ECF Nos. 97-1 (conf. version) & 98-1 (pub. version) at 32–33). The party complained
that 2013 Philippines reports, unlike any other countries’ figures, included filtration anthracite within the
category of anthracite coal. Calgon Carbon Corp., 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1318.
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arguments about the contemporaneous Philippines data and used the previous
year’s Philippines data.139 This change produced a dumping margin of
$0.04.140 The Court of International Trade found the Commerce Department
failed to convincingly explain its preference for the previous year’s Philippine
data over contemporaneous data from at least five other countries.141 Upon
remand, the Commerce Department chose to use Thai data, which produced a
dumping margin of $0.52.142
In these remand results the Commerce Department explained how it ended
up with Thailand as the surrogate country instead of South Africa or
Ukraine.143 It chose Thailand over the other options, “based on which
[potential] surrogate country is the most significant producer of comparable
merchandise.”144 The Commerce Department made this decision at the same
time it was explaining its rejection of Thai data in Fresh Garlic with the
justification that “the criterion is significant production, not the most
production.”145 This contradiction is technically justifiable because of the
difference in circumstances between the two calculations. Unlike in Fresh
Garlic, the Commerce Department in Calgon decided to go with the largest
producer only after first going through the entire sequential analysis and
determining that three economically comparable countries who were
significant producers all had equally reliable data sets.146 That the Commerce
Department would have found the data sets equally reliable in Calgon but not
so in Fresh Garlic exemplifies how unpredictable the Commerce Department’s
process often is.

139
Although the Commerce Department agreed, rather than switching to another country, it decided to
use the 2012 Philippines report, which no party had challenged in the previous year’s review. Calgon Carbon
Corp., 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1318–19. If the Commerce Department had reason to think why the 2012 Philippines
report did not also have a broader definition of anthracite coal, the Commerce Department declined to state
what it was, and instead seemed to have relied on the fact that the parties had waived their right to complain
about its accuracy. Calgon Carbon Corp, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1227–28.
140
Calgon Carbon Corp, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1228.
141
Id. at 1233–34.
142
Id. at 1228–29.
143
Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand at 15, Calgon Carbon Corp., 190 F.
Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 14-00326).
144
Id. at 15–16
145
See U.S. DEPT. OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., A-570-831, supra note 133, at 8.
146
Compare Calgon Carbon Corp., 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1228–29, with Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v.
United States, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1243 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016).
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IV. ANTIDUMPING DUTY CALCULATIONS IN CANADA
The Commerce Department is not alone among the administering agencies
of antidumping measures to use a questionable method. Canadian unfair trade
remedy law is laid out in the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA).147 Because
it is also based on GATT Article VI, the substance of SIMA differs very little
from that of the Tariff Act of 1930. The dumping margin assigned is equal to
the normal value minus the export price of the goods.148 In the context of nonmarket economies,149 the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) usually
determines the normal value of the good by finding “the aggregate of the cost
of production of [a] like good[], a reasonable amount for administrative, selling
and all other costs, and a reasonable amount for profits.”150 These values are
found in the same way they are in the United States—by looking to another
country. This surrogate country can be “any country other than Canada
designated by the President” of CBSA.151 Furthermore, as with the Commerce
Department in the United States, there exists very little substantive statutory or
regulatory guidance for how the CBSA should choose the surrogate country152
or how it should use the factors of production, costs, and profit numbers to
create a surrogate value.153
Canadian law and practice does differ from that of the United States in two
crucial ways. First, rather than require that respondents and petitioners provide
data from a list of potential surrogate countries, the CBSA simply sends out a
request for information to producers of other countries.154 Unsurprisingly,

147

Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-15 (Can.).
Id. c 30.2(1)–(2).
149
SIMA does not use the precise term “nonmarket economy country,” instead referring more to export
monopolies. See id. c 20(1). However, the situations for when the special procedures come in are quite similar.
Compare id. c 20(1)(a) (referring to a country “where . . . domestic prices are substantially determined by the
government of that country and there is sufficient reason to believe that they are not substantially the same as
they would be if they were determined in a competitive market”), with 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(a) (2015)
(referring to a country that “does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing . . . so that sales of
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise”).
150
Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-15, s 20(1)(c)(ii) (Can.).
151
Id. c 20(1)(c).
152
Technically, in certain circumstances, the CBSA’s discretion is limited by a prohibition against
choosing a country where the like good, in the opinion of the CBSA, is itself being dumped or whose price has
been influenced by a non-market economy. See Special Import Measures Regulations, SOR/84-927 17.1
(Can.).
153
Id. c 14-17.2.
154
See, e.g., CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, 4214-31JAD/1390, Statement of Reasons, Certain PUP
Joints Originating in or Exported from the People’s Republic of China, at ¶ 102-03 (2012) (Can.),
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1390/ad1390-i11-fd-eng.pdf.
148
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these requests rarely produce viable information.155 Once this happens, the
CBSA’s president can simply choose any country he or she wants.156 This
discretion is magnified by the absence in Canadian law of the requirement that
the valuation be “based on the best available information.”157 Thus, the
Canadian government actually has significantly more discretion than the
Commerce Department in how to select a surrogate country. As the Federal
Court of Appeal noted in a 2006 case,
The questions of whether the President . . . properly calculated the
margins of dumping draw on the President’s expertise in
international trade matters. These issues are technical and the statute
[in establishing the factors of production method] . . . confers some
discretion on the President. Were courts to become mired in all the
minutia of detail informing a margin of dumping calculation, it is
sure that they would not see the light of the day beneath the volumes
of evidence that would assuredly be produced—as they were in this
case—on judicial review. This factor points to more, and
considerable, deference.158

Given the CBSA’s administrative flexibility, companies have always been
extremely hesitant to challenge CBSA’s determination of a dumping margin.159
This does not necessarily mean, though, that Canadian determinations are more
accurate or even are more predictable in arriving at a surrogate country.
Unfortunately, the CBSA does not publicly release the value of the
antidumping duties it assesses. A joint study between the Commerce
Department and the CBSA would shed additional light on the reliability of
NME calculations more generally. Given China’s dominance of the market and
the obvious proximity of Canada to the United States, the antidumping duty
assessed by Canadians and that assessed by Americans for the same product

155
Id.; CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, 4214-22 AD/1379, Statement of Reasons, Certain Aluminum
Extrusions Originating in or Exported from the People’s Republic of China, at ¶ 32 (2009) (Can.),
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1379/ad1379-i08-fd-eng.pdf; CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, 421422 AD/1379, Statement of Reasons, Certain Aluminum Extrusions Originating in or Exported from the
People’s Republic of China, at ¶ 94 (2008) (Can.), http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1379/ad1379i08-pd-eng.html.
156
Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-15, s 20(1)(d)(1) (Can.).
157
See Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
158
Uniboard Surfaces Inc. v. Kronotex Fussboden GmbH & Co. KG, [2006] FCA 398, para. 60 (Can.
Fed. Ct. App.).
159
Cf. ANDREW M. LANOUETTE & CHRISTOPHER KENT, CANADA: HIGH DEFERENCE, STARK REALITY 29
(Müslüm Yilmaz ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) (noting that in the nineteen years between 1994 and 2013,
only eight challenges to a dumping margin made it up to the Federal Court of Appeals).
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should theoretically be the same. Any differences would be the result of the
different methodologies used by each administering agency.
V. A PATH FORWARD
China’s status as a non-market economy is a highly contentious issue.
China strongly contends that the 2001 agreement outlining China’s accession
to the WTO required other WTO members, including the United States,
Canada, and the EU, to have granted China a market economy status on
December 11, 2016.160 For the first fifteen years after the agreement was
ratified, Article 15 subparagraph (a)(ii) clearly allowed importing nations to
use a methodology for antidumping duty cases that was “not based on . . .
domestic prices or costs in China.”161 Sub-paragraph (d)’s language regarding
what was supposed to happen after fifteen years is the source of the contention.
U.S. and EU lawyers note that “the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be
terminated” only “[o]nce China has established, under the national law of the
importing WTO Member[s] that it is a market economy.”162 As China points
out, though, the following sentence reads, “[i]n any event, the provisions of
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession.”163 When
read together, the first sentence seems to be stating that, if China proves itself
to be a market economy before the fifteenth anniversary, then WTO members
must treat China as a market economy. The second sentence then explains
what must happen, no matter what, once fifteen years have passed. At that
point, WTO members must use Chinese domestic prices in their antidumping
duty calculations. Others interpret the provision differently.164 China feels so
strongly that its interpretation is correct that it filed disputes in the WTO
against both the United States and the EU on December 12, 2016.165

160
World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China of 10
November 2001, art. 15, WTO Doc. WT/L/432, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.
htm.
161
Id. ¶ (a)(ii).
162
Id. ¶ (d).
163
Id.
164
Compare Christian Tietje & Karsten Nowrot, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy Status
under WTO Anti-Dumping Law After 2016, 34 POL’Y PAPERS ON TRANSNAT’L ECON. L. 2, 7 (Dec. 2011) and
Bernard O’Connor, Market Economy Status for China is Not Automatic, VOX (Nov. 27, 2011), with Helena
Detlof & Hilda Fridh, The EU Treatment of Non-Market Economy Countries in Anti-Dumping Proceedings, 2
GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 265, 268 (2007).
165
U.S. Set to Review China’s Market-Economy Status Bid, WSJ Says, supra note 3; Request for
Consultations by China, European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WTO
Doc. WT/DS516/1 (Dec. 12, 2016).
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While arguments will continue about the legality of the U.S. and EU
decisions not to act, the fact remains that President Trump’s rhetoric indicates
that it is highly unlikely that the U.S. decision will grant China market
economy status in the near future.166 President Trump’s rhetoric would be
consistent with the recent EU rejection of a proposal to grant China market
economy status.167 Considering the control exerted and aid provided by the
Chinese government in many sectors, this is, at the very least, an easily
defensible position.168 However, this does not mean that the Commerce
Department or Congress should not seek to improve the current system.
The Commerce Department should consider promulgating a rule that sets
forth a mathematical formula that makes arriving at a surrogate country more
predictable. In effect, the Commerce Department could apply the
hypotenuse/distance formula to countries’ GNI per capita and good production
data to see what country is closest to the NME in question. How similar a
potential surrogate Nation (“N”) is to an Exporting NME country (“E”) in
respect to a certain Dumped product (“D”) can be reflected by a similarity
score (“s-score” or “S”) determined by the following formula where the lower
the value of S, the more similar E is to N:
S = √((GE-GN)2+(YE-YN)2)
In the formula, the G represents each country’s GNI per capita. The Y
represents the yearly production of comparable merchandise to D for each
country. Given how extensive the international classification systems already
are, the term “comparable merchandise” should be defined as merchandise that
would have the same eight-digit Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) code.
Because of the vast differences in scale between the GNI per capita
numbers (G) and the production numbers (Y), for every set of s-score
calculations made for D and E, the G and Y values would have to be
normalized to the same scale.169 To provide the desired predictability, the
normalization process would have to be set as a part of the regulation. I would
suggest normalizing production and GNI numbers, respectively, according to
the per country and per capita numbers for the set of countries that individually
166

Bey, supra note 8.
Daniela Vincenti, EU Lawmakers Reject Granting China Market Economy Status, EURACTIV
(May 12, 2016), https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/eu-lawmakers-reject-granting-china-themarket-economy-status/.
168
Bulloch, supra note 3.
169
For instance, from the honey example, without normalization, if each countries’ honey production
were measured in metric tons, the s-scores would be different than if they were all measured in ounces.
167
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make up at least 0.2% of the world’s total production. More specifically, I
would suggest comparing the z-scores generated from the G and Y numbers of
countries with at least 0.2% of the world’s production.170 The general idea of
this normalization process is, in effect, to set the scale of the axes on which the
GNI and production data can be plotted so that their distance from the NME
country’s information can be measured. Setting a minimum threshold ensures
that the production of the good is on a scale large enough to justify the
assumption that the potential surrogate country’s production practices are not
unreasonably dissimilar from that of the NME country with its much greater
economies of scale.171
Having calculated the s-score for all countries meeting the 0.2% threshold,
the Commerce Department can remove NMEs, countries with information of
insufficient reliability, and countries with merchandise that may be comparable
but which the Commerce Department still determines differs from D and the
values of its factors of production so as to significantly distort the calculation
of D’s cost of production. Here, the Commerce Department should keep the
accessibility requirement but add that, unless accompanied by a full translation
and step-by-step instructions for reproducing the information, data from nonEnglish websites will be deemed unreliable.
This method can be summarized as a six-step process. Step 1: Create a list
consisting of the GNI per capita and amount of goods produced for every
country. Step 2: Remove all countries whose production is less than 0.2% of
the world production. Step 3: For the remaining countries, transform their GNI
per capita and production numbers into z-scores. Step 4: Calculate the s-scores
from the z-scores. Step 5: Remove any NME country from the list. Step 6:
Remove countries with unreliable data or data the Commerce Department
believes are significantly distortive because of differences in factors of
production. Whatever remaining country has the smallest s-score should be the
surrogate country.
To provide a concrete example, the formula can be applied to the
Vietnamese honey hypothetical from above to produce the following sscores:172

170
“A z-score . . . indicates how many standard deviations an element is from the mean.” Z Score, STAT
TREK, http://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=z%20score (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
171
Setting the minimum threshold would certainly require input during the rulemaking process.
172
For a list of other countries’ s-scores, see Table 5 below.
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TABLE 4
Country

Honey Production “Y”
(tonnes)

GNI per Capita
“G” (USD)

S-Score

India

61,945

1,560

.700

Tanzania

30,905

920

.251

Romania

18,040

9,600

.452

Vietnam

14,218

1,900

0

Australia

13,198

64,860

3.668

Poland

12,836

13,360

.684

Uzbekistan

8,751

2,110

.081

Egypt

5,443

3,250

.151

Pakistan

4,371

1,390

.147

Morocco

3,800

3,040

.167

Nicaragua

560

1,890

Did not make
0.2% cutoff

From the outset, Nicaragua’s red dye clearly does not count as comparable
merchandise because it would have a different eight-digit HTS code. Without
the dye, its production did not meet the 0.2% threshold, so it was not included
in the s-score calculations. Of the countries for which an s-score was
calculated, Uzbekistan had the lowest, but its status as an NME means it too is
disqualified.173 Pakistan has the next lowest s-score, so it would be the
surrogate country, assuming the information did not come from an unreliable
website and that translations and instructions were included. If not, the
Commerce Department would instead use Egypt. Because Egypt’s numbers are
acceptable, the Commerce Department would not have to make a
determination as to whether it thought that the difference between the
medicinal honey in Morocco and the edible honey of Vietnam meant that cost
of labor in Moroccan beehives differed enough from that of Vietnam so as to
significantly distort the calculation of the cost of producing honey in Vietnam.

173
See supra note 64; 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) (2012) requires that the surrogate country be a market
economy. However, it is preferable to have NMEs remain in the s-score analysis until the very end because of
how beneficial additional data is to the calculations. More specifically, their inclusion helps make the z-scores
more accurate by giving additional points to factor into the standard deviation.
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This same methodology could be applied to determine what the best
surrogate country would have been for each administrative review of Chinese
fresh garlic imports discussed above. For example, in the 18th review, the most
similar countries to China were India, Egypt, and Myanmar.174 No questions
were raised about the reliability or quality of India’s data, so it would have
been the surrogate country.
Given the divisive nature of free trade in today’s political environment, any
change to the method for calculating antidumping duties could only occur if it
did not require Congressional action. In fact, adoption of such a framework
should be possible under the current legislation. As noted above, the Tariff Act
of 1930 does not set out many rules governing how the Commerce Department
can select a surrogate country.175 The statute simply mandates that the
Commerce Department meet three requirements in going about such work.
First, it must base its determination on “the value of [a good’s] factors of
production.”176 Second, it must base the valuation of the factors of production
“on best information available.”177 Third, the Commerce Department must also
ground the valuation of the factors of production in the NME on the factors’
costs in a surrogate country that is “at a level of economic development
comparable to that of the non-market economy, and significant producers of
comparable merchandise.”178 The process suggested in this Comment easily
meets those three requirements; it still uses the (1) best information available
to calculate the (2) values of the product’s factors of productions, and it relies
(3) on economic and production information to find a surrogate country.
Adopting such a process would not only benefit companies by improving
the predictability of the Commerce Department’s determinations, but could
also benefit the Department itself. Given the lack of boundaries placed on the
Commerce Department and the fact that even small changes to the values
given to the factors of production can cause the results to change dramatically,
every decision the Department has to make in antidumping duty

174
These three countries are listed in order of their similarities to China. See Table 6. The data on that
table comes from two sources: FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/
#data/QL (last visited Jan. 23, 2018); GNI per Capita Ranking Atlas Method (Current US$), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2015&name_desc=false&start=2014 (last visited Jan. 23,
2018).
175
See supra Parts II and III.
176
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B).
177
Id.
178
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4).
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determinations is an act of discretion which must be justified.179 Because of the
wide discretion it reserves for the Commerce Department, Policy Bulletin 04.1
is a general statement of policy which the “agency cannot . . . rely upon” to
justify its decisions.180 When implementing a new process, the Commerce
Department should strive as much as possible to promulgate actual rules; doing
so would make explaining the purpose behind its actions much easier.
How reliable is the United States’ current method for finding a surrogate
country and ultimately establishing a product’s dumping margin? The
preceding paragraphs suggest the answer is “not very.” This says much more
about the immense complexities of the assigned task than anything about the
Commerce Department’s abilities. It also explains why China is so eager for
the United States and the EU to start treating it as a market economy for tariff
purposes. Given the rising tensions between the United States and China over
trade, adopting the method proposed here would be both a good way to
demonstrate a willingness to work towards a solution as well as a way to make
things easier for the Commerce Department and to reduce prices for American
consumers.
ADAM WILLIAMS∗

179
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–9 (1983)
(“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.”).
180
Unwired Planet, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 841 F. 3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016); U.S. Magnesium v.
United States, 31 Ct. Int’l Trade 988, 991 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) (“[T]he relevant policy bulletin, while
meriting “respect,” lacks the force of law to “legally” bind Commerce on its face.”).
∗
Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Emory University
School of Law (2018); Masters in Middle East Studies, George Washington University (2012); Bachelor of
Arts, Dartmouth College (2010). The author would like to thank Professor Robert Ahdieh for his advice in
writing this Comment. The author would also like to thank the Emory International Law Review Executive
Board for their input throughout the editing and publication process. Finally, the author would like to thank his
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Country
China
Turkey
United
States
Iran
Russia
Ukraine
India
Mexico
Brazil
Canada
Spain
Tanzania
Angola
South
Korea
Germany
Uruguay
Romania
New
Zealand
Hungary
Vietnam
Australia
Poland
Taiwan
Portugal
United
Kingdom
Bulgaria
Uzbekistan
Thailand
Cuba
Czechia
Croatia
Egypt
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GNI per
Capita
($)
7,520
12,590

TABLE 5
Honey
Percent of
Produced
World
(tonnes)
Production
462,028
30.59%
103,525
6.85%

S-Score
6.5747
1.4501

55,380

80,862

5.35%

3.2653

6,530
14,420
3,560
1,560
10,190
12,020
51,750
29,290
920
4,470

76,000
74,868
66,521
61,945
60,624
38,481
36,993
32,174
30,905
23,434

5.03%
4.96%
4.40%
4.10%
4.01%
2.55%
2.45%
2.13%
2.05%
1.55%

0.9453
1.1502
0.7730
0.7001
0.8345
0.6886
2.9233
1.6173
0.2513
0.2017

26,800

23,131

1.53%

1.4565

47,680
16,230
9,600

20,195
19,600
18,040

1.34%
1.30%
1.19%

2.6685
0.8386
0.4521

41,530

17,608

1.17%

2.3093

13,460
1,900
64,860
13,630
21,260

17,000
14,218
13,198
12,836
11,572
10,451

1.13%
0.94%
0.87%
0.85%
0.77%
0.69%

0.6747
0.0000
3.6680
0.6837
N/A
1.1292

43,760

9,546

0.63%

2.4397

7,720
2,110
5,750
18,790
13,150
3,250

9,268
8,751
8,736
7,900
7,163
6,269
5,443

0.61%
0.58%
0.58%
0.52%
0.47%
0.42%
0.36%

0.3467
0.0811
0.2383
N/A
0.9894
0.6657
0.1508
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Rank
44
33
42
28
32
25
24
26
23
41
35
16
10
34
39
27
19
37
21
N/A
43
22
N/A
31
38
18
1
14
N/A
30
20
3
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Algeria
Guatemala
Serbia
Pakistan
Georgia
Slovakia
Austria
Moldova
Morocco
Tajikistan
Myanmar
Senegal
Tunisia
Israel
Albania
Nicaragua
The World

4/12/2018 12:04 PM

ANTIDUMPING DUTY CALCULATIONS

5,470
3,450
5,840
1,390
4,490
18,110
50,150
2,560
3,040
1,340
1,240
1,030
4,130
35,680
4,450
1,890
7,520

5,425
4,893
4,383
4,371
4,100
4,080
3,900
3,896
3,800
3,715
3,573
3,467
3,300
3,200
3,100
560
1,510,568

0.36%
0.32%
0.29%
0.29%
0.27%
0.27%
0.26%
0.26%
0.25%
0.25%
0.24%
0.23%
0.22%
0.21%
0.21%
0.04%
100%

0.2447
0.1639
0.2711
0.1474
0.2116
0.9560
2.8150
0.1562
0.1666
0.1574
0.1608
0.1656
0.2062
1.9746
0.2206
N/A
N/A

463

15
7
17
2
12
29
40
4
9
5
6
8
11
36
13
N/A
N/A
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TABLE 6

Country

GNI
per
Capita
($)

Garlic
Produced
(tonnes)

Percent
of
World
Production

GNI Z-Score

79.82%

0.364391319

-4.788842714

0

Garlic ZScore

SScore

China

5,060

India

1,380

18,429,50
0
1,057,800

4.58%

0.682909147

-0.033114597

4.7664

Egypt

2,520

295,845

1.28%

0.584237863

0.175480464

4.9692

South Korea

22,540

295,002

1.28%

-1.148568362

0.175711246

5.1900

Russia

11,040

233,948

1.01%

-0.153200151

0.192425571

5.0081

1,020

Myanmar

212,601

0.92%

0.714068499

0.198269589

4.9994

Bangladesh
United
States
Ukraine

870

209,153

0.91%

0.727051563

0.199213523

5.0012

50,460

190,690

0.83%

-3.565149271

0.204268009

6.3539

3,120

171,900

0.74%

0.532305608

0.209412015

5.0011

Argentina

10,610

145,791

0.63%

-0.115982035

0.216559692

5.0284

Brazil

11,010

143,293

0.62%

-0.150603538

0.217243552

5.0325

Spain

31,140

140,762

0.61%

-1.892930676

0.217936446

5.4921

1,530

127,633

0.55%

0.669926083

0.22153068

5.0197

390

123,962

0.54%

0.768597366

0.222535664

5.0277

Uzbekistan
Ethiopia
Peru

4,860

88,468

0.38%

0.38170207

0.232252607

5.0211

Turkey

11,230

79,203

0.34%

-0.169645365

0.234789021

5.0519

Taiwan

-

78,134

0.34%

0.802353332

0.235081673

5.0430

North Korea

-

77,000

0.33%

0.802353332

0.235392121

5.0433

Thailand

4,950

75,589

0.33%

0.373912232

0.2357784

5.0246

Iran

6,700

73,910

0.32%

0.222443157

0.236238048

5.0271

Romania

8,610

66,602

0.29%

0.05712548

0.238238708

5.0365

Mexico

9,170

58,065

0.25%

0.008655376

0.240575822

5.0420

Pakistan

1,150

55,308

0.24%

0.702816511

0.241330587

5.0415

Algeria

4,580

53,981

0.23%

0.405937123

0.24169387

5.0307

Nepal

600

41,183

0.18%

Kyrgyzstan

880

30,592

0.13%

Italy

37,680

30,585

0.13%

Syria

-

30,543

0.13%
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Sudan

1,480

30,000

0.13%

Cuba

5,870

26,000

0.11%

Guatemala

2,850

25,883

0.11%

Kazakhstan

8,280

23,280

0.10%

Morocco

3,000

22,376

0.10%

Tunisia
Other
Countries
The World

3,980

21,720

0.09%

N/A

321,883

1.39%

N/A

23088185

100%

465

